(This essay is adapted from the following video)
The war between Russia and Ukraine inevitably brought Aleksandr Dugin, the Russian philosopher and public intellectual, duped “Putin's brain”, to the spotlight.
Interestingly, in recent months, Dugin also gained a significant amount of attention from Chinese social media. A diverse array of Chinese political commentators, both institutional and independent, have been scrutinizing Dugin or Dugalism. Surprisingly, resulting in a remarkably polarized set of viewpoints.
This essay navigates through the dichotomous perspectives on Dugin within Chinese political realm, unraveling its implications for the future landscape of a multipolar world. It also shares the author’s discoveries and speculations on why and how Duganism is going to be embraced in China and shape Chinese political ideology.
The exposition begins with an elucidation of Duginism, particularly based on his Fourth Political Theory. The analysis proceeds to juxtapose interpretations of Duginism between liberal Chinese factions, characterized by pro-Western beliefs and often termed the Chinese right, and the more traditionally aligned Chinese mainstream media and think tanks, typically labeled the Chinese left. It’s noteworthy the political nomenclature of ‘left’ and ‘right’ in China inversely mirrors that of the Western world.
Subsequent sections delve into the inherent contradictions between Duginism and China's orthodox belief systems, culminating in a discerning exploration of reasons and methodologies through which Duginism might resonate with the Chinese leadership, both ideologically and politically. The essay conjectures the utility of Duganism in fortifying China’s current foreign policy and posits its role in heralding a multipolar world where China as a pivotal player.
Before delving deeper, the author clarifies her stance as a political realist and an independent observer of China, distancing from any singular pro- or anti- China narratives. The aim of my essay and other content creation is to foster nuanced discourse, often sidestepped or misrepresented by mainstream media across both the U.S. and China.
The discourse navigates through Dugin’s work, "The Fourth Political Theory", with insights from notable American scholars such as Chad Haag and Michael Millerman. The theory
According to a xxx by Chad Haag, in his FPT, Dugin claims
the 20th century was a century of ideologies. Before that, there wasn't an ideology the way we understand it today. In most parts of the world, before ideology came into play, religion, dynasties, states, classes, and nation-states played an enormous role in the lives of people and societies.
The first political theory, liberalism, is about the individual. The second political theory is communalism or socialism; it's about class. The third political theory is fascism or national socialism; it's about state or race. Dugin believes liberalism is the only one left as a sole ideology by the end of the 20th century, past World War I and II and the Cold War.
However, he also points out that liberalism eventually disappeared and turned into a different entity, or so-called post-liberalism. It is stripped of a political dimension and turned itself into a global market society. Other ideologies have failed to combat liberalism; therefore, the Fourth Political Theory is needed.
In Dugin's Fourth Political Theory, it squarely rejects globalization. It is against Westernism, liberalism, fascism, communism, modernism. It objects to infinite progress, unipolarity, and individualism and, consequently, of course, it is also anti-Americanism.
What does it believe? The Fourth Political Theory believes in traditionalism, collectivism, and conservatism. It believes in multipolarity, civilizations, and very importantly, the reversibility of time or dasien.
Dugin's Journey to China: A Mosaic of Reactions
In 2018, Aleksandr Dugin received a high-profile invitation to China, extended by a state-sponsored think tank. His engagement included a speech at Fudan University in Shanghai, which was broadcast by a prominent pro-Chinese government media outlet and was followed by an interview on CCTV. Within China, the political scientist and philosopher appeared to be warmly received by the Chinese mainstream, a reception largely attributed to his anti-American stance and advocacy for a multipolar world order—views that resonate with Chinese political ideology.
However, it was only in recent months, amidst the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, that the more liberal faction of the Chinese political spectrum, or the Chinese right, began scrutinizing Dugin. Their perspective on Duganism, in stark contrast, has been markedly negative.Their criticism can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, Dugin is regarded as Putin's intellectual influence, and with Putin perceived as a detrimental dictator, Dugin's reputation is consequently tarnished. Secondly, Duganism is perceived as a symbol of Russian expansionism, and considering the historical context of China losing territory to Russia, this ideology casts Russia as an unfriendly entity.
Despite Dugin's vocal opposition to American-led unipolarism and his advocacy for China's integration into a multipolar world, envisioning it as a co-leader alongside Russia., his stance is seen as somewhat paradoxical. Russia, amidst its own limitations, cannot realistically aspire to a bipolar world order, especially with China's ascent. Such is the crux of the Chinese critique.
Duganism and China: Alignment and Contradictions
If we set aside these overly simplistic conclusions about Dugin from the Chinese perspective and delve deeper, we find that Duganism both contradicts and aligns with traditional Chinese ideology. By examining this complex interplay, we can gain insights into China's trajectory post-COVID era and amidst its evolving relations with Western societies. Furthermore, it offers a fascinating perspective on how China may recalibrate its relationship with capitalism.
The most notable contradiction lies in Dugin's outright rejection of communism. He dismisses the concept of a classless communist utopia, highlighting Marxism's inability to foresee the actual emergence of communalism. Interestingly, Dugin acknowledges a certain merit in communalism; he notes its early recognition of the totalitarian tendencies inherent in liberalism, a foresight missed by other ideologies.
Is China Still a Communist State? A Comparative Perspective with Russia
The question is complex. On a secular level, visible signs of Marxism or communism propaganda in the Chinese people's daily lives seem to have diminished. Many would agree that China has increasingly embraced capitalist-friendly policies and life styles. Despite this shift, the principles of communalism continue to underpin the political theory and ideology of the Chinese central leadership. A key factor is the role of communism in legitimizing the historical continuity of the Chinese Communist Party. Notably, the Party recently celebrated its 100th anniversary, affirming its status as one of the longest-standing political parties in modern history, alongside that of North Korea.
If you still doubt it, the data is definitely telling us so. You may or may not have heard of Chinese central party schools, state-run institute chains designated for teaching Marxism and communalism doctrines. It is a breeding ground of party members who are to serve the one-party government in China. Today, there are about 3,000 Chinese universities, and just recently, people are starting to notice that the number of Chinese party schools is surpassing Chinese universities.
If you still have doubts, the data speaks volumes. You might be aware of the Chinese central party schools(中央党校), a network of state-run institutions tasked with disseminating Marxism and communalism doctrines. These schools serve as a breeding ground for party members who are groomed to serve in China's one-party government system. Presently, there are around 3,000 universities in China. Recent observations indicate that the number of Chinese party schools is now exceeding that of the universities.
Meanwhile, Russia's stance on communism is a nuanced topic in China. For instance, in 2016, Putin openly criticized Soviet founder Lenin, blaming him for implanting a 'time bomb' within the state, a statement that received significant attention in Western media. In contrast, in 2022, just before the Beijing Winter Olympics and his visit to Beijing, Putin publicly wished Gorbachev a happy 91st birthday, a gesture that garnered minimal, if any, coverage in China. Given this context, it's plausible to infer that Dugin's disapproval of communism is likely to remain unaddressed or minimally discussed within China.
Globalization Reconsidered: China's Pivot Towards Financial Sovereignty
As for Dugin's objection to globalization, it presents an intriguing contrast. Economically, China is widely regarded as one of the foremost beneficiaries of globalization, with its GDP having grown to become the world's second-largest. Until not long ago, Chinese assets were deemed one of the most attractive one in the emerging market sector by the Wall Street investors. However, this trend faced a dramatic halt around 2020. A series of events, including Ant Financial's tumultuous IPO, Didi's delisting from the American stock exchange, and President Xi's stringent crackdown on Chinese real estate developers and major tech firms like Alibaba, all point to a significant shift.
As 2021 drew to a close, many were apprehensive about the fate of Evergrande, China's largest real estate developer. There was widespread concern that its potential default could inflict extensive collateral damage on the economy, and there was a belief that President Xi might intervene to bail out the company. However, Xi's response diverged from such expectations. Instead, Chinese government officials were instructed by Beijing to prevent offshore Western capital from capitalizing on the situation — specifically, from acquiring Chinese assets at depressed prices following Evergrande's default.
Essentially, Xi prioritized safeguarding the Chinese market from Western financial intervention, even amid looming economic turmoil. This approach starkly contrasts with the financial dynamics observed during the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict when the ruble plummeted shortly after sanctions were imposed. Notably, American banks, including Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase, swiftly moved to acquire devalued Russian assets, such as bonds and corporate debts.
It appears that Xi is decidedly opposed to such market interventions and manipulative practices. This suggests that President Xi is committed to a long-term strategy aimed at reshaping the role of capitalism in China. This perspective might explain the timing of Dugin's invitation to China in 2018, approximately five years after Xi assumed the presidency. It's plausible that Dugin's philosophy, which may not have been favorably received by the leadership prior to Xi's tenure, found a more receptive audience under Xi's administration.
China's True Vulnerability: a Void in Ideological Framework?
How Duganism is going to be assimilated into China's ideological framework is still unfolding. However, after analyzing its contradictions and alignments with China's orthodox ideology, I have concluded that Duganism is more likely to be embraced than criticized in China. This stems from the fact that China, as a formidable nation-state, has not yet established a value system within its foreign policy capable of rivaling Western ideologies. Put differently, in the current global geopolitical landscape, where America, Russia, and China stand as the three main powers, China is the only one lacking a distinct post-World War II ideological framework.
Duganism potentially offers a toolkit to fill in this void.
America's value system, or what Durance terms 'American-style peak liberalism,' served as a beacon for the Western world, aided by its extensive strategy of forging military alliances among Western nations, propelling America to become and remain the world's preeminent power. On the other hand, Russia, despite its weaker economy and the ongoing recovery from the Soviet Union's collapse, and widespread rejection by the West, maintains its regional influence, anchored by its Eurasianism ideology and its status as the largest Eastern Orthodox nation-state, backed by significant military might, ensuring Russia's continued sway over its neighboring states.
The New Eurasianism movement , an ideology masterminded by Dugin and other Russian intellectuals, has gained substantial traction among various populations, irrespective of Western approval. Dugin posits that in today's world order, a state that resists liberalism is inherently weak.
While China distances itself from Western-style liberalism, it lacks a robust alternative to assert itself proactively. Consequently, it often finds itself on the defensive. Therefore, China's perceived weakness stems not from its rejection of liberalism per se, but from the absence of a compelling ideological alternative.
Reflecting on China's decades of journey of opening up to the world, the country has established itself as the 'world's factory' and an indispensable part of the global economy. It has embraced Wall Street-style capitalism, creating numerous millionaires or even billionaires, yet the disparity in wealth remains strikingly large. China has realized that its economic model is, to some extent, dependent on the Western global market. As a nation-state, it lacks a comprehensive strategy to position itself on par with America, and to a certain degree, even with Russia. This status quo persisted until the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, formerly known as One Belt One Road.
The progression of China's Belt and Road Initiative puts America's dominant power system on notice for the first time. Although not surprisingly, it received pushback and negative reviews from China's own economists and, needless to say, from the West. But as a foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiatives is probably the only grand strategy that China can call an offense to the Western dominance. Now, China needs a value system or ideology to play alongside its first-ever foreign policy that's in parallel to America's, and Duginism came to be an ideal choice to shape such a system.
Not because Dugin's philosophy is a perfect match—in fact, it contradicts the Chinese Communist Party's orthodox ideology in so many ways, as discussed earlier. But it is perfect, as Duginism is an open system. It does not emphasize any specific premises, as scholars such as Chad Haag and Michael Millerman both pointed out. Just as the Chinese government likes to claim that China has built its political theory on "socialism with Chinese characteristics," I came to believe that we will soon see "Duginism with Chinese characteristics."